Mark Johnston takes reality to be wholly objective or impersonal, and aims to show that the inevitability of death does not obliterate goodness in such a naturalistic world.
arguments. The reason that I approach his discussion this way is that I find it extremely complicated, with multiple ideas in play at once, and I want to extract a single continuous strand of thought from them.
For Impersonal Altruism
The first part of the continuous strand is an argument for impersonal altruism. Its first premise is that there are no persisting selves worth caring about. 5 Selves are supposed to provide independent justification for seeking premium treatment for oneself.
Johnston defines a self as the center of an arena of presence, an all-inclusive psychological field, a sort of container for all your conscious experiences, a bed for your stream of consciousness. But, he argues, it is indeterminate whether an arena of presence considered at one time is identical to an arena of presence considered at a different time. There is no fact of the matter about whether someone 'continue [s] to be at the center of this arena of presence.' 6 Johnston says: 'There need be no determinate content to the prospective subjective question, the question of whether such and such a human being in the future will be me.' 7 So, an arena of presence, in terms of which a self is defined as its center, is only an intentional object, like Macbeth's dagger. 8 And 'given 5 Selves, according to Johnston, are to provide independent justification for seeking premium treatment. Johnston takes Kant's claim that we are radically evil to be the manifestly true claim 'that there is something at the root of human nature that disposes each one of us to favor himself or herself over the others.' This is why his thinking of 'Johnston as me, as the one at the center of this arena, makes him appear privileged, even if he is actually just one human being among the others.' (Johnston, Surviving Death 158) In contrast to Johnston, I think of the asymmetry between myself and others to be a matter of the first-person perspective, not a matter of thinking of myself as the center of an arena. And I think of exemplifying the robust first-person perspective as having ontological import, not moral import. 6 Johnston, Surviving Death, 168 7 Johnston, Surviving Death 175. This question seems to me to be rooted in Johnston's discussions with Parfit. I myself never pick out a person in the future and ask if it will be me. Never. 8 Johnston, Surviving Death, 169 9 Johnston, Surviving Death, 231. Johnston's aim in denying that there are persistent selves is to show that self-concern is irrational. Here is an argument: 1. What really matters is to be me, not to be this human being.
2. To be me is to be at center of this arena of presence, self. 3. I-this self-am defined only relative to this arena of presence. 4. This center of presence is an intentional item, a virtual item at which perspectival modes of presentations appear to converge-and not a feature of the world. 5. This self is not a feature of the world. 6. It's irrational to care about this self.
10 Johnston, Surviving Death, 238 11 Johnston also calls the first-personal reasons 'de se' reasons. Johnston characterizes de se thought as 'thought about oneself as oneself,' thought that one typically expresses in the first person. (Johnston, Surviving Death 189) 12 I should mention that Johnston distinguishes between two forms of 'I' thought: one merely indexical to register information about the person who tokens it, and the other truly subjective, 'mediated by thinking of oneself as some person or other qua at the center of an immediately given arena of consciousness. ' (Johnston, Surviving Death 193) On his view, however, the second form of 'I' thought is illusory. I make no such distinction between merely indexical 'I' thoughts and truly de se 'I' thoughts. A child, derived from 'Everyone has reason to see that the mess he makes in public places is cleaned up.'
13
Johnston explicitly includes not only moral and prudential reasons in the category of practical reasons, but also reasons of etiquette. 14 Johnston says that basic first-personal practical reasons-reasons that derive only from one's own interests-have 'no force because they depend for their coherence on the persistence of a self worth caring about.'
15
If there is no persisting self worth caring about, there is nothing (no self) that that can be 'a rational object of special concern.' 16 So, all practical reasons 'are derived simply from the structure of impersonal reasons.'
17
In that case, 'the premium or excess that self-concern expects...cannot represent a reasonable demand or expectation.' So, impersonal altruism-the disposition to absorb the legitimate interests of others-is required by the structure of reason.
18
Here's a sketch of Johnston's argument from the structure of reasons as I understand it:
(1) There are no persisting selves worth caring about. 19 who uses 'I' in a merely indexical way (if there are such), simply hasn't completely mastered the use of the first-person pronoun. 13 Johnston, Surviving Death, 189 14 Johnston, Surviving Death, 9. Even my special attachment to friends and family, because they are my friends and family derives 'from an objective point of view, anyway owed to family members, friends and others. ' (Johnston, Surviving Death 191) If Johnston is right, the command to cease considering oneself as an entity of special concern is the command of agape -the New Testament command of universal love. The command of agape is not merely a moral command; 24 it is rather the command 'to live in accord with the practical reasons that there actually are. And that is all "goodness" in the practical realm can reasonably be to taken to mean.'
25
This argument from the structure of practical reasons, to which I'll turn critically later, paves the way for the discussion of how to become a good person, an impersonal altruist. The discussion of how to become good shifts the focus from the self, which depends on a merely intentional object (an arena of presence), to 'the person I presently find myself to be.'
How We Can Become Good

26
This person is an embodied human being, with an individual personality. Johnston offers a 'radical reversal' of the idea of personal identity over time.
The naive intuitive view that Johnston wants to reverse is that 'the relation of personal identity independently justifies certain future-directed dispositions.'
27
According to the radical reversal, personal identity does not justify certain future-oriented dispositions, but rather the reverse. The radical reversal is that personal identity itself is determined by a certain future-directed disposition that we can alter, thereby altering the changes we can survive.
28
That is, we can change the conditions under which we can survive.
How is it that we can change our conditions of survival? Well, we are Protean. Here is a reconstruction of of Johnston's argument How to Become Good:
(1) We are Protean persons -i.e., the terms of our survival depend on our dispositions.
(2) If we are Protean, then we can re-figure our identity-determining dispositions in a way that makes us good persons -i.e., we can become disposed to 34 Johnston, Surviving Death, 275 35 Johnston, Surviving Death, 327 36 Johnston, Surviving Death, 296 37 Johnston, Surviving Death, 14 absorb the legitimate interests of persons at all times at which we take them to exist. 38 (C2) We can become good persons -i.e., we can become disposed to absorb the legitimate interests of persons at all times at which we take them to exist.
How the Good Literally Survive Death in a Naturalistic World
A good person -at least an extremely good person -alters her identityconstituting dispositions by giving up concern with any individual personality and becoming impersonally altruistic.
39
In any naturalistic world, 'death obliterates one's individual personality.' Nevertheless, 'if there are extremely good people, they are not only able to face down death, that is, face the obliteration of their own individual personality without feeling it to be a tragic loss, they are also able literally to survive death.' Johnston says, 'you will have become something that is present whenever and wherever individual personality is present.'
41
The good can live on in the lives of countless others because they are Protean.
Johnston offers an analogy: Protean people are higher-order individuals like speciese.g., The tiger is a sub-kind of the kind Panthera. The species, constituted by a succession of organisms, admits not only variable constitution but also multiple Here is a sketch of how the good literally survive death in a naturalistic universe:
(1) Good persons alter their identity-constituting dispositions by 'identifying fundamentally with the interests of the arbitrary other,' and become disposed to absorb the legitimate interests of other persons (who are not closed to goodness) in the present and in the future.
53
(2) If (1), then the good are (and will be) present wherever and whenever good people are present. 
A Critical Look at Johnston's Arguments
Still, I do not believe that Johnston has shown that the ideal of goodness is not obliterated in a naturalistic world. Let's look at the arguments again.
Is the argument for (C1) -the argument from "no self" to impersonal altruismsound? The argument is valid, but, I think, unsound. I'll not challenge the first premise, that there is no persisting self worth caring about. However, there seems to be a dialectical oddity in Johnston's 'no-self' strategy. In order for the illusoriness of the self to play its intended role, Johnston must first characterize a self in such a way that there seem to be selves as well as persons: Johnston must assume that many or most of us take selves to exist.
57
The self is supposed to be something with a subjective principle of unity: same arena of presence, same self. But there are no selves for the reason that there is no sense to the notion of 'same arena of presence.' Johnston introduced the distinction between 57 Johnston distinguishes self-identity from personal identity. 'Self-identity, the identity that guarantees the coninuation of one's immediately available arena of presence over time, is more basic in its importance than personal identity, the identity over time of the public person who happens now to be at the center of one's arena of presence. Johnston picks out his (hylomorphic) self as 'the self that I am is constituted by a potential succession of persons united by the following cross-time unity condition -that they be successively at the center of this arena of presence.' (Johnston, Surviving Death 204) This self is 'presently constituted by Johnston. Johnston presently has the property of being me.' (Johnston, Surviving Death 206) There's prima facie evidence that we trace selves, he says, 'by bringing to bear a salient subjective unity conditions, rather than tracking persons by offloading onto the most salient substance in the vicinity:' We're haunted by thoughts of an afterlife in which we come to be things different from human beings, or we come back as another person. (Johnston, Surviving Death 212) selves and persons only to discredit the reality of selves. 58 However, if my view -which we'll consider later -is correct, we are no more committed to centers of arenas of presence than we are to Dennett's Cartesian Theatre. Such a Cartesian approach is a nonstarter. Nevertheless, I agree that there are no selves in addition to persons -despite the dialectical oddity.
The premise of the argument for (C1) that I want to challenge is premise (3): While I agree that there are no selves (albeit on different grounds from Johnston's), and hence no 'rational object of special self-concern,' I also believe that there are nonderivative first-personal practical reasons. So, let me propose four candidates for basic first-personal practical reasons -that is, for reasons for acting that derive only from one's own interests aand not from impersonal reasons: Second, suppose that the reason that I'm wearing widow's weeds is that my dear husband died and I want to mourn him this way. (Not everyone whose dear husband dies does or should wear widow's weeds; it's not part of our culture to wear them.) Johnston himself says that it would be 'ham-fisted and obscene' to interfere with someone's 58 It is only because Johnston equates being me with being at the center of this arena of presence and action that he can say that 'the idea that there is nothing real to being you, when properly grasped, is even more terrifying than death.' (Johnston, Surviving Death 164) 'Perhaps the key to deathlessness is the realization that YOU, in the relevant sense, could not possibly be real-are anyway, not real enough to justify a temporally extended pattern of self-concern, which manifests itself inyour everyday egocentrism and in your special fear of your own(most) death.' (Johnston, Surviving Death 179) mourning the death of a beloved other. 59 Well, yes -although that opinion seems to me completely at odds with impersonal altruism. (The mourner is not treating the dead beloved as an arbitrary other.) It seems otiose to insist that the reason that one grieves in one way rather than another must be derived from the structure of impersonal practical reasons. really must manifest a robust first-person perspective-that is, I must exercise a capacity to conceive of myself as myself in the first person in order even to try to align my interests with the interests of an arbitrary other. So, the premises of the argument for (C2), if true, presuppose that robust first-person perspectives are exemplified.
Ontologically speaking, there is no place in a wholly objective world for a robust first-person perspective. So, either one of the premises in the argument for (C2) is false, or the universe is not wholly objective. Either way, Johnston has not shown that his conception of goodness can be realized in a wholly impersonal and objective universe.
66
A similar argument holds for the first premise of the argument for (C3).
As impressive as I think Johnston's argument is, I do not think that it succeeds in
showing how the ideal of goodness can survive in a wholly objective and impersonal world. Now, let me turn briefly to my own account of persons that also denies the existence of selves, but still holds to irreducible first-personal properties.
Persons and the First-Person Perspective
66 And even when Johnston makes no obvious first-person reference, what he says presupposes first-person perspectives. For example: Johnston says that a good will 'is a disposition to absorb the legitimate interests of any present or future individual personality into one's present practical outlook, so that those interests count as much as one's own. ' (Johnston, Surviving Death 332) No one can count the interests of others as much as her own unless she can conceive of herself as herself in the first person. A world with such first-person perspectives is not the wholly objective and impersonal world of naturalism.
My view is similar to Johnston's up to a point: Persons are essentially embodied but they do not essentially have the bodies that they in fact have. 67 Rather, persons are constituted by bodies with which they are not identical.
68
Here is where I part ways with Johnston: I don't think that persons can be One last thought: The people whose legitimate interests we are supposed to align ourselves with are all the human beings who are not permanently closed to goodness. It seems possible to not be permanently closed to goodness while believing that, say, the entire bourgeoisie should be eliminated -even if one included oneself in that group. That is, one need not be permanently closed to goodness to believe that the entire bourgeoisie (including oneself) should be eliminated. If so, then, for all that's been said, we should align ourselves with that person's legitimate interests. Ah, but no, you might object.
Eliminating the bourgeoisie is not a legitimate interest. I agree, but then you need a more substantive view of goodness to rule out eliminating the bourgeoisie as a legitimate interest. If so, then Johnston's conception of goodness as it stands is anemic.
Conclusion
I agree with Johnston that there are no selves. perspective is not tied to seeking special treatment, but is a capacity whose exerciss is presupposed by a great variety of human activities.
Ontologically, we all are selfless persons: there are no selves, but there are persons with first-person perspectives. Morally, only those few who never seek special treatment are selfless. To be selfless in either sense entails that first-person perspectives, first-person dispositional properties, are exemplified. If I am right, then the very existence of selfless persons insures that reality is not wholly objective. And if reality is not wholly objective, where does that leave naturalism?
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